






The Philosophical Concept of Life and 
Its Role in the Foundation of an Integrative Bioethics
Abstract
The essay demonstrates how bioethics can find an ethical dimension of its own and an 
original source of normativity by taking a fresh look at the concept of life. This requires a 
concept of life which is more than empirical, the logic of which is developed, in the first 
instance, from the insights arrived at by the philosophers of German idealism, but also 
from those of the more recent phenomenology of life. The basic problem of an integrative 
bioethics consists then in thinking through the development of an ethics with a fundamental 
attachment to the actuality of life, where the latter always precedes the former. Depend-
ing on the side that the emphasis is placed, bioethics acquires either a more ‘Apollonian’ 
rational or a ‘Dionysian’ vitalistic character, although integrating the two into a synthesis 











(I)  The first thesis is that a bioethics which is a really new approach to ethi-
cal questions and not just an applied ethics requires a concept of life 


















(II) The central problem of bioethics is how the presupposed concept of ‘life’ 
and the concept of philosophical ‘ethics’ can really be combined in a 
systematically acceptable way. This problem becomes acute when con-









other  starts  from something  like sensibility or  indeterminate  feelings about 
what  life,  as  something more  than  rationality, may  teach us. The  first may 





































































identity  of  the  external  and  the  internal,  the  universal  and  the  individual, 
the one and  the many. This  idea will become clearer somewhat  later when 
we consider Hegel and his dialectical concept of life, but let us start with a 
number of general reflections. As has already been mentioned,  life is not a 
simple  ‘object’  of our  reference. We cannot  simply  refer  to  life  and  forget 
that this referring is in itself an act of life. Life is an end in itself and should 
not, therefore, be subjected to finite ends or taken as a mere means. Human 
dignity and its intimate correlation with the individual right to life is stressed, 
e.g.,  in Kant’s  arguments  against  abortion. Abortion means  the destruction 
of an individual real  instance of  life or an already living individual (which 
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2. Kant and the idea of life
Regarding  the  idea of  life, Kant can be considered a somewhat ambiguous 
thinker. On  the one hand,  ‘life’ and ‘living’ constitute something such as a 
‘vital thread’ running right through all of Kant’s philosophy and the develop-
ment of his system. In his first work from 1747 entitled Thoughts on the True 
Estimation of Living Forces,  in which he argues more or  less  in  favour of 
Leibniz’s dynamics, Kant introduces the idea of a vis activa or a ‘living force’ 
as an at  least metaphysically  legitimate concept. Then,  there  is also Kant’s 

























nian law of inertia. In Kant’s Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science 
we also have the following:
“Now we know no other  internal principle of a substance  to change  its  state but desire, and 






Life  is,  therefore,  something not  to be  found  in  real,  external  and material 







the  capability of  a being  to  refer  to  itself by external  representations or  in 
a  reflexive way.  Life  is  itself  an  instance  of  reflexivity,  and,  according  to 
Kant,  it  therefore  belongs  to  the  realm of  subjectivity. Thus,  for Kant, we 
ical First Principles of the Doctrine of Right” 
(§28),  in:  Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics 
of Morals, trans. by Mary Gregor, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 1991, p. 99. In 
this  sense,  Kant  considers  the  suicide  of  a 
pregnant woman  to be  the murder of a  sec-
ond person; cf. Immanuel Kant, “Metaphysi-
cal First Principles of the Doctrine of Virtue” 




Kraft”,  “der  seine  Bewegung  in  sich  selber 
hinlänglich gründet, so daß aus seiner inneren 
Bestrebung  hinlänglich  verstanden  werden 
kann, daß er die Bewegung, die er hat,  frei, 
immerwährend und unvermindert ins unend-
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sence and phenomenon. In his Frankfurt Fragment of a System from 1800 at 
the latest, Hegel tried to show that life has to be understood as a dialectical 
identity of the universal and the individual, the whole and its elements, and 






The model  for  this  living morality and essential unity of  form and content 
in ethics, according to Hegel, is the ancient Greek polis, which for him rep-
resents  the  ideal mediation between  the whole and  the  individual, between 
objective spirit and personality, between laws and their ‘cultural’ embedding. 


















derstood dialectically,  it  is never a simple  ‘object’ of our  reference. We 





an  immediate  “fact”.  It means  a being-in-relations,  and  therefore  refers 
to mediations by which  in every  individual  aspect of  life  the  totality  is 
present,  and  simultaneously  in  every  representation of  the  totality  indi-






kind  of  nominalism which  underlies  transcendental  philosophy  (Kant’s 





acquire our knowledge of  life  from an external point of view, but  from 
inside it. And we know what life is with the immediate certainty that our 
knowing life is itself a demonstration of the reality of what we mean by 









of  self-consciousness does not  lie  in conceiving oneself as an object of 
one’s own consciousness, but in conceiving life and understanding imme-
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some lectures on bioethical issues under the title The Future of Human Nature 
(Die Zukunft der menschlichen Natur).10 Fukuyama, an American economist, 
published a book  in 2002  that  soon became very well-known – Our Post-
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of life and knowing in subjective knowledge has to be considered as the on-







Of course, conflicts will  still  remain, conflicts  regarding  the difference be-
tween freedoms and  the different ways  that  freedoms seek  to become real. 
But these conflicts are not unfamiliar to life, which is itself a rather conflicted 















Filozofski pojam života i njegova uloga 
u zasnivanju jedne integrativne bioetike
Sažetak
U članku se pokazuje kako bioetika može pronaći vlastitu etičku dimenziju i originalan izvor 
normativnosti bacajući iznova pogled na pojam života. Za to je potreban pojam života koji nije 
samo empirijski, a čija je logika izvedena u prvom redu iz uvida do kojih su došli filozofi nje-
mačkog idealizma, ali i iz uvida novije fenomenologije života. Stoga se osnovni problem jedne 
integrativne bioetike sastoji u promišljanju razvoja etike u temeljnoj povezanosti s aktualnošću 
života, gdje ovo drugo prethodi onome prvom. Ovisno o tome na koju se stranu stavlja naglasak, 
bioetika zadobiva ili više »apolonijski« racionalni ili više »dionizijski« vitalistički karakter, 








Der philosophische Begriff des Lebens und 
seine Rolle für die Begründung einer integrativen Bioethik
Zusammenfassung
Der Beitrag zeigt auf, dass ein neuer Blick auf den Begriff des Lebens und seine Logik der 
Bioethik eine genuine ethische Dimension jenseits nur angewandter Ethik zu geben sowie eine 
eigene Quelle von Normativität zu erschließen vermag. Erforderlich ist dafür der Rückgang auf 
einen mehr als empirisch-objektiven Lebensbegriff, weshalb zunächst auf Einsichten zurückge-
gangen wird, die Kant und die Denker des deutschen Idealismus vorgetragen haben, die aber 
auch in der neueren Phänomenologie wiederkehren. Das Grundproblem einer integrativen Bio-
ethik besteht dann darin, die Spannung zwischen einer sich rational entfaltenden Ethik, die auf 
die Vollzugsgröße „Leben“ bezogen sein will, und dieser letzteren selbst, die aller Entfaltung 
einer „Ethik“ vorausliegt, in angemessener Weise theoretisch einzuholen. Man kann je nach 
Schwerpunkt und Ausrichtung eine „apollinische“ (eher rationalistische) von einer „diony-
sischen“ (eher lebensphilosophischen) Form von Bioethik unterscheiden, wobei das philoso-




Le concept philosophique de vie et ses enjeux  
dans l’établissement  d’une bioéthique intégrative
Résumé
Cet article montre comment la bioéthique peut trouver sa propre dimension éthique et une sour-
ce de normativité originale en jetant un nouveau regard sur le concept de vie. Pour cela, il est 
nécessaire d’avoir un concept de vie qui n’est pas seulement empirique et dont la logique est 
amenée au premier plan à partir de l’examen des philosophes de l’idéalisme allemand, mais 
également à partir de l’examen de la nouvelle phénoménologie de la vie. C’est pourquoi, le 
problème principal d’une bioéthique intégrative consiste en une réflexion sur le développement 
éthique en lien  fondamental avec l’actualité de la vie, où celle-ci précède celui-là. En fonction 
du point sur lequel est mis l’accent, la bioéthique acquiert un caractère  rationnel « apollo-
nien » ou plus vitaliste « dionysiaque », bien que la tâche essentielle soit d’intégrer ces deux 
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